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Abstract
In an economy with a capital income tax distortion, the social discount rate (SDR) should
reflect the social opportunity cost of capital rather than the social rate of time preference
(consumption rate of interest) to ensure that public investments can produce Pareto
improvements. The marginal cost of funds may exceed unity for a lump sum tax, but it is
irrelevant for project evaluation. Even if a social welfare improvement is judged to be
possible without passing the compensation test, the SDR should still reflect the social
opportunity cost of capital to ensure that the project is the most efficient use of public
funds.
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Introduction

This paper is an attempt to reconcile three criteria for project evaluation that
are prominent in the literature: the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC) criterion proposed by Harberger (1973) and Sandmo-Dreze (1971) (HSD), which
discounts benefits and costs at a rate that reflects the social opportunity cost
of capital (a weighted average of the pre-tax and after-tax rates of return);
the social rate of time preference approach (STP) proposed by Marglin (1964),
Feldstein (1972), Bradford (1975) and Lind (1982), which converts benefits and
costs into their “consumption equivalents” by shadow pricing all investment
displaced or induced and discounting at the social rate of time preference (typically represented by the after-tax rate of return); and the marginal cost of funds
(MCF) approach recently proposed by Liu (2003) and Liu et al (2004), which
discounts benefits at either the after-tax rate of return or the pre-tax rate of return depending upon whether they are intra-generational or inter-generational,
and discounts costs (including any “indirect revenue eﬀects”) at the pre-tax rate
of return, but multiplies all costs and indirect revenue eﬀects by the MCF.
The MCF criterion recognizes that if there are pre-existing distortions, in
particular a capital income tax distortion, raising a dollar of revenue via a lump
sum tax will cost more than a dollar because the tax increase will reduce saving
and lower capital income tax revenue. Liu (2003) argues that the MCF must
be an integral part of any multi-period project evaluation, and the SOC and
STP criteria are both deficient because they fail to take the MCF into account.
However, I believe there is some misunderstanding about how to apply the SOC
and STP criteria. I show that if these criteria are implemented properly they
are both consistent with the MCF criterion; all criteria correctly identify welfare
improving projects. This three way equivalence is fragile however; it holds
only in the context of an infinitely lived representative agent model. Using an
overlapping generations model in which individuals have finite lives and make no
bequests I show that the SOC criterion and the MCF criterion both correctly
identify Pareto improving projects, but the STP criterion fails to meet this
standard.
The SOC and STP criteria take the distortionary tax structure as given,
so the marginal dollar of revenue to finance any project is obtained via lump
sum taxation (or government borrowing with the debt serviced via lump sum
taxation). Liu (2003) claims that when there are pre-existing distortions even
a lump sum tax can carry an excess burden. However, whether a lump sum tax
carries an excess burden is a matter of semantics.1 A lump sum tax may be the
least damaging form of tax, in which case any other form of tax would carry an
excess burden. On the other hand, when distortionary taxes are present a lump
sum tax may raise less revenue than the tax itself, in which case the damage
exceeds the amount of tax revenue raised. For purposes of multi-period project
evaluation, if the project produces benefits that are treated as income a straightforward application of the SOC criterion proposed by HSD is appropriate. For
1 See

e.g. Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
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any project whose benefits are not treated as income there will be “indirect revenue eﬀects”, but they can be incorporated by adding to or subtracting from the
project’s net benefits. In either case, it is not necessary to take the MCF into
account in applying the SOC criterion. On the other hand, the MCF criterion is
also perfectly valid, but the marginal cost of funds is sensitive to the model and
so is the appropriate discount rate for evaluating project benefits. This makes
the MCF criterion diﬃcult to implement compared to the SOC criterion.
Insofar as the STP criterion is concerned, it turns out to be equivalent to
the MCF criterion in the context of an infinitely lived representative agent
model provided that the proportions of project expenditure that are drawn
from consumption and investment are properly specified. But this equivalence
breaks down in an overlapping generations model in which benefits and costs
accrue to diﬀerent generations.
The points raised here might seem somewhat arcane and esoteric, but they
turn out to be extremely important in practical applications of social cost-benefit
analysis. For over 40 years the economics profession has debated what is the
appropriate social discount rate. The wide disparity in preferred numerical values for the social discount rate among the experts that is reported in Weitzman
(2001) reflects either fundamental disagreement about what are the appropriate
conceptual foundations for the social discount rate or serious misunderstanding about what social cost-benefit analysis is supposed to achieve. Those who
propose to discount benefits and costs at the relatively low social rate of time
preference (approximated by the after tax rate of return) seem to believe that
concerns about opportunity cost can be adequately addressed by shadow pricing all investment displaced or induced by the project. It is debatable whether
they fully appreciate that the procedure implicitly adopts a particular utilitarian social welfare function that not everyone would accept, and in addition
ignores more eﬃcient ways of achieving the income distribution that the project
achieves. It is the aim of this paper to shed further light on these issues and in
the process to remove some dissonance from the social discount rate debate.
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Infinitely Lived Representative Agent Model

Consider the following simplified version of the infinitely lived representative
agent model used by Liu (2003). Assume the representative agent earns an
exogenous pre-tax wage, w, and pre-tax rate of return on assets, ρ, but incurs
a tax, T , on labour income and a tax at proportional rate τ on capital income .
There are two goods available in each period: a composite private good ct , and
a publicly provided good g t . Labour supply is exogenous, so any tax on labour
income is eﬀectively a lump sum tax.2
Given the time path of the publicly provided good, the representative agent
chooses a time path for private consumption {ct } to maximize
t
t t
Σ∞
t=0 β U (c , g )
2 The model could be generalized by introducing labour-leisure choice as in Liu (2003), but
this would just complicate the algebra without changing the basic insights.
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subject to
t
t
∞
t
t
Σ∞
t=0 c /(1 + r) = Σt=0 (w − T )/(1 + r) + A0
t
Here g is the supply of the publicly provided good in period t, A0 is initial
assets, and T t is the lump sum tax in period t. The consumer’s discount rate is
the after tax rate of return r = (1 − τ )ρ.
From the first order conditions, consumption in each period is a function of
the present value of lump sum taxes and the time path of the publicly provided
good so ct (g, T ). Well-being can therefore be written as U (c(g, T ), g) = V (g, T ).
A project is represented by a sequence of expenditures {dI t } and outputs
{dg t }. At issue is whether the project is worthwhile.
Following Liu (2003), I assume that the government cannot appropriate
the benefits of the publicly provided good through user fees or normal market transactions. The government’s budget constraint therefore requires that
the discounted sum of tax revenue {Rt } minus project expenditures {I t } must
be equal to its initial net indebtedness D0 . The discount rate is the pre-tax rate
of return ρ. Thus,
t
t
t
0
Σ∞
t=0 (R − I )/(1 + ρ) = D
Tax revenue in period t is lump sum taxes plus capital income taxes, and
capital income taxes depend upon assets in period t, where assets in period
t depend upon the present value of the time stream of lump sum taxes and
conceivably as well the time stream of the publicly provided good.
Rt = T t + τ ρAt (g, T )
Now consider a small project that requires an initial expenditure dI 0 and
produces a stream of output dg t in periods t = 1 and thereafter. The project
is worthwhile if the representative agent is made better oﬀ. Since V (g, T ) is
her indirect utility function and assuming, with no loss in generality, that the
project is financed by an increase in lump sum taxes in period 0 3 , the project
will make the representative agent better oﬀ if
t
t
Σ∞
t=1 (∂V /∂g )dg + (∂V /∂T0 )dT0 > 0
Dividing through by ∂V /∂T0 and making use of the envelope theorem, this
can be re-written
as
∂U/∂g t
t
Σ∞
t=1 ∂U/∂c0 dg − dT0 > 0
The project’s benefit in period t, denoted by B t , is valued at ptg dg t , where
t
pg = (∂U/∂g t )/(∂U/∂ct ) represents the marginal rate of substitution between
the publicly provided good and the composite private good in period t. From the
first order conditions for a consumer optimum β t (∂U/∂ct )(1 + r)t = ∂U/∂c0 .
Therefore the representative agent will be better oﬀ with the project if the
benefits discounted at the after tax rate of return exceed the lump sum tax
increase required to finance the project, i.e. if
t
t
(1) Σ∞
t=1 B /(1 + r) − dT0 > 0.
A project costing dI 0 that is financed by a lump sum tax increase dT 0 is
fiscally feasible (i.e. satisfies the government budget constraint) if the present
3 Ricardian equivalence holds in the ILA model, so the timing of any lump sum tax increase
is irrelevant.
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value of the additional tax revenue collected is equal to the project’s expenditure
requirements. Thus
t
t
0
(2) dT 0 + Σ∞
t=1 dR /(1 + ρ) = dI
The second term on the left hand side captures the induced eﬀect of the
project and its financing on the present value of capital income tax revenue. This
depends on the impact of the lump sum tax increase on assets in all subsequent
periods as well as any impact of the project itself on assets. Since Rt = T t +
τ ρAt , the change in tax
t = 1 and thereafter
is
£ revenuet in periods
¤
i
i
t
0
0
dRt = τ ρdAt = τ ρ Σ∞
(∂A
/∂g
)dg
+
(∂A
/∂T
)dT
i=1
t
i
i
Define IRt = τ ρΣ∞
i=1 (∂A /∂g )dg as the “indirect revenue eﬀect” of the
project in period t. It represents the impact of the project on capital income
tax revenue in period t.
For simplicity, I will focus on a project that produces a constant stream
of output in perpetuity beginning in period 1 so dg t = dg for t = 1, ...∞.
In addition, I will assume that the representative agent’s pure rate of time
preference is equal to the after tax rate of return so she consumes the annuity
value of wealth. The project therefore produces a perpetual stream of benefits
worth B beginning in period 1. In addition, private consumption in each period
equals permanent income so ct = w−T +rA. A lump sum tax increase of dT 0 will
therefore reduce consumption in periods 0 and thereafter by dct = −rdT 0 /(1 +
r), assets in periods 1 and thereafter will decrease by dAt = −dT 0 /(1 + r),
and tax revenue in periods t = 1 and thereafter will decrease by dRt = IRt −
τ ρdT 0 /(1 + r).
Now substitute for dRt in equation (2) and we find that a project is fiscally
feasible if
t
t
0
(3) dT 0 [1 − τ /(1 + r)] + Σ∞
t=1 IR /(1 + ρ) = dI
The expression in square brackets can be interpreted as the “marginal cost
of funds” (MCF) for a lump sum tax increase. The reason is as follows. The
MCF is the ratio of the increase in lump sum taxes to the increase in the present
value of total taxes
collected. Thus
£
¤
£
¤
t
0
t
∞
t
0
t
M CF = 1/ Σ∞
t=0 (dR /dT )/(1 + ρ) = 1/ 1 + Σt=1 τ ρ(dA /dT )/(1 + ρ)
Since dAt /dT 0 = −1/(1 + r), the M CF simplifies to M CF = ρ(1 + r)/r(1 +
ρ).
Now use equation (3) to eliminate dT 0 from equation (1) and we find that
the representative agent will be better
£ 0 oﬀ∞with tthe project
¤ provided that
t
t
t
(4) Σ∞
t=1 B /(1 + r) − M CF dI − Σt=1 IR /(1 + ρ) ≥ 0
According to equation (4), the project is worthwhile provided that the benefits discounted at the after tax rate of return exceed the project’s direct expenditures minus any indirect revenue eﬀects all discounted at the pre-tax rate
of return and mulitiplied by the MCF. This is the MCF criterion proposed by
Liu (2003).
Liu argues that both the SOC criterion and the STP criterion are flawed. He
maintains that the SOC criterion proposes to discount both benefits and costs
at the social opportunity cost of capital, here identified by ρ, while ignoring any
indirect revenue eﬀects. If this were true it would clearly conflict with the MCF
criterion, even in situations where indirect revenue eﬀects were assumed to be
4

zero. On the other hand, the STP criterion proposes to convert all investment
displaced or induced by the project into its consumption equivalent and discount
at the after tax rate of return. For projects with deferred costs as well as
deferred benefits the STP criterion would conflict with the MCF criterion even
when there are no indirect revenue eﬀects and the MCF happened to equal the
appropriate conversion factor.
I aim to show that Liu’s claims are incorrect. Both the SOC criterion and the
STP criterion are equivalent to the MCF criterion if they are implemented properly. To facilitate the argument I will focus on two special cases that have drawn
the most attention in the literature: project benefits being fully consumed, and
project benefits being treated as equivalent to income.

2.1

Benefits Fully Consumed

A project may or may not aﬀect private sector behaviour, even though the
private sector has a willingness to pay for the project’s output. Given the
additively separable intertemporal structure of the utility function, an increase
in g t has no eﬀect on the marginal utility of private consumption in time periods
other than period t. If we impose the additional restriction that ∂ 2 U/∂ct ∂g t =
0, the project has no eﬀect on the marginal utility of private consumption in
period t. Then an increase in g t will leave the time path of private consumption
unaﬀected, i.e. ∂ci /∂g t = 0, for all i. The project’s benefits will be “fully
consumed” in the period in which they are produced so the project leaves no
trace in terms of private consumption, a property known as “uncompensated
independence”.4 A project that has no impact on private consumption will have
no impact on saving, and therefore no impact on assets or capital income tax
revenue. In other words, the indirect revenue eﬀects of the project will be zero.
Setting IRt = 0 in equation (4), the MCF criterion simplifies to
t
t
0
Σ∞
t=1 B /(1 + r) − M CF.dI > 0
For a project requiring an initial expenditure of dI 0 that produces a perpetual stream of benefits worth B beginning in period 1, with the benefits being
fully consumed, the M CF criterion simplifies to
(5) − dI 0 .M CF + B/r > 0.
How should the SOC criterion be applied in this situation? The SOC criterion proposed by Harberger (1973) and Sandmo-Dreze (1971) requires that
all benefits and costs (including any “indirect revenue eﬀects”) be discounted
at a rate reflecting the social opportunity cost of capital.5 The benchmark for
4 Wildasin (1984) emphasizes the distinction between compensated and uncompensated
independence in deriving criteria for the optimal supply of a public good in a static context.
See also Browning (1987).
5 Harberger (1973, pp. 47-48) explicitly states that whenever the project induces a shift in
demand or supply in any market that is distorted by a tax, the magnitude of the shift should
be multiplied by the tax wedge and the resulting indirect revenue eﬀects should be added
to (or subtracted from) net benefits, which are discounted at the SOC rate. Sjaastad and
Wisecarver (1977, p. 533) also emphasize that Harberger’s SOC rate refers only to the raising
of funds, while acknowledging that how the funds are spent can aﬀect private sector decisions.
Sandmo-Dreze (1971) do not explicitly address indirect revenue eﬀects, but their specification
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measuring indirect revenue eﬀects using the SOC criterion is a project whose
benefits are a perfect substitute for income, i.e. a project whose impact on private sector behaviour is equivalent to the impact of an increase in income equal
to the project’s benefits. This is a project for which ∂ci /∂g t = ptg ∂ci /∂y t for all
i, where y t is income in period t and ptg is the marginal willingness to pay for a
unit of the project’s output in period t. But according to the Slutsky equation,
∂ci /∂g t = (∂ci /∂g t )u + ptg ∂ci /∂y t , so the SOC criterion takes as its benchmark
a project for which the compensated eﬀect on consumption in all periods is zero,
i.e. (∂ci /∂g t )u = 0, for all i.
In applying the SOC criterion, indirect revenue eﬀects are defined as the
compensated eﬀect of the project on capital income tax revenue. Thus the
indirect revenue eﬀect in period i of a project that yields output of dg t in periods
t = 1, 2, ...∞ is the impact of the project on capital income tax revenue in period
i
i
t
t
i. IRsoc
= −τ ρΣ∞
t=1 (∂c /∂g )u dg
If the project’s benefits are in fact fully consumed, then ∂ci /∂g t = 0 for all
i. Therefore (∂ci /∂g t )u = −ptg ∂ci /∂y t = −ptg (∂ci /∂y0 )/(1 + r)t < 0, so the
compensated eﬀect of the project on consumption is negative in all periods; the
project will reduce consumption in all periods relative to the benchmark. Since
any reduction in consumption is an increase in saving (and therefore assets), the
indirect revenue eﬀects of the project will be positive. Specifically, the indirect
revenue eﬀect of the project in period i is
£ t
¤ t
i
i
t
t
∞
i
t
IRsoc
= −τ ρΣ∞
t=1 (∂c /∂g )u dg = τ ρΣt=1 pg (∂c /∂y0 )/(1 + r) dg = τ ρB/(1+
r).6
Intuitively, if the project produces benefits worth B in perpetuity starting
in period 1, and if these benefits are fully consumed, the project will reduce
private consumption (increase saving) by B/(1 + r) relative to the benchmark,
i.e. relative to a project whose benefits are treated as equivalent to income.
Therefore, relative to the SOC benchmark the project will generate additional
capital income tax revenue equal to τ ρB/(1 +r) in all subsequent periods.7 The
SOC criterion applied to this project then becomes
(6) − dI 0 + B/ρ + IRsoc /ρ > 0
Benefits and costs, including indirect revenue eﬀects, should be discounted
at the SOC rate.
assumes that the compensated impact of the project on private consumption (and therefore
saving) is zero. See also Burgess (1988).
6 Since the project yields a constant stream of output, dg t = dg for all t, and pt dg t = B t =
g
B for all t by assumption. Finally, ∂ci /∂y0 = r/(1+r) for all i assuming that the representative
agent consumes the annuity value of wealth. Making these substitutions results in the last
equality.
7 A project with benefits worth B starting in period 1 and continuing in perpetuity will
increase wealth by B/r if these benefits are regarded as a perfect substitute for income.
Assuming the representative agent consumes the annuity value of wealth, her consumption
will increase in each period starting in period 0 by B/(1 + r) and capital income tax revenue
will decrease in each period starting in period 1 by τ ρB/(1 + r). Since the project’s benefits
are fully consumed, it will increase capital income tax revenue in each period starting in
period 1 by τ ρB/(1 + r) compared to the benchmark that is used for the SOC criterion, i.e.
a project whose benefits are a perfect substitute for income.
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To confirm that the SOC criterion is equivalent to the MCF criterion, substitute for IRsoc = τ ρB/(1 + r) to obtain the condition
−dI 0 + B/ρ + τ ρB/(1 + r)ρ > 0
which simplifies to
−dI 0 + B(1 + ρ)/ρ(1 + r) > 0
This can be re-written as
−dI 0 .M CF + B/r > 0
which is the MCF criterion arrived at in equation (4). Benefits should be
discounted at the after-tax rate, whereas costs should be discounted at the pretax rate but multiplied by the MCF.

2.2

Benefits Treated as Income

The assumption that the project has no impact on private sector behaviour is
very special. Indeed, it can be argued that if a person who experiences a change
in the level of a publicly provided good takes no actions whatsoever in response
the publicly provided good is not a significant source of value for the person.8
More plausible is the notion that the publicly provided good g t and contemporaneous private consumption ct are substitutes rather than independents or
complements. An increase in g t then lowers the marginal utility of private consumption in period t leaving the marginal utility of private consumption in all
other periods unchanged. In an eﬀort to smooth consumption, the individual
responds by reducing private consumption in period t and increasing private
consumption in all other periods. If g t and ct were complements, the individual
would respond by increasing consumption in period t and reducing consumption
in all other periods which seems counter-intuitive for an individual striving to
smooth consumption over her lifetime.
t
t
t t
Suppose the utility function takes the form Σ∞
t=0 β U (c , q(e , g )) where U (.)
and q(.) are monotonic increasing and concave functions of their arguments. In
this formulation private expenditure in period t consists of two components:
ordinary private consumption ct , and averting expenditure et that is motivated
solely by the desire to mitigate the adverse eﬀects of the limited supply of
the publicly provided good g t . One can imagine the publicly provided good g t
serving as an input along with a private good et in the “household production” of
q t . The formulation therefore allows g t and et to be imperfect substitutes in the
production of q t .9 An increase g t will increase ci in all periods including period
t, increase ei in all periods except period t, but reduce et and “private spending”
in period t (defined as ct + et ). If suﬃcient income is then taken away to keep
utility fixed, ci and ei will be unchanged for all i and only et will decrease, with
the decrease in et being equal to the reduction in income required to keep utility
fixed.10 In other words, (∂ci /∂g t )u = ∂ci /∂g t −ptg (∂ci /∂y0 )/(1+r)t = 0, for all
8 See

e.g. Larson (1993).
special case of g t being a perfect substitute for some private good et is included in
this specification, but it is unnecessarily restrictive. See Liu et al (2005).
1 0 This is an extension to an inter-temporal context of the model of defensive spending
formulated by Courant and Porter (1981) and Bartik (1988).
9 The
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i. The private sector will respond to an increase in the publicly provided good
g t in the same way as it would to an increase in a lump sum transfer equal to
the public’s willingness to pay for g t . Since the compensated response in ci to
an increase in g t is zero for all i, the uncompensated response must be positive.
Specifically, ∂ci /∂g t = ptg (∂ci /∂y0 )/(1 + r)t > 0 for all i.
In applying the MCF criterion, the indirect revenue eﬀect is the uncompensated eﬀect of the project on£ capital income tax ¤revenue. Thus IRi =
i
t
t
∞
t
i
t
t
−τ ρΣ∞
t=1 (∂c /∂g )dg = −τ ρΣt=1 pg (∂c /∂y0 )/(1 + r) dg = −τ ρB/(1 + r)
t
11
when dg = dg, for all t.
Intuitively, the project’s benefits are equivalent to income worth B each
period beginning in period 1, so the project will increase consumption in period 0
and thereafter by dct = B/(1+r), and decrease assets in period 1 and thereafter
by dAt = −B/(1 + r). Since the income on assets is subject to tax at rate
τ the indirect revenue eﬀect of the project in periods t = 1, ...∞ is IRt =
−τ ρB/(1 + r). The MCF criterion applied to a project whose benefits are
equivalent© to income becomes
ª
(7) − dI 0 + τ B/(1 + r) M CF + B/r > 0
To confirm that the MCF criterion represented by (7) correctly identifies all
welfare improving projects, recall that a project is worthwhile if (1) holds, and
the project is fiscally feasible if it satisfies the government budget constraint (2).
But dRt = τ ρdAt , and dAt = −(B + dT 0©)/(1 + r). Therefore,
ª to satisfy (2) the
lump sum tax increase must be dT 0 = dI 0 + τ B/(1 + r) ρ(1 + r)/r(1 + ρ).
Substitute this expression into (1) and recall that the MCF for a lump sum tax
is M CF = ρ(1 + r)/r(1 + ρ). The result is (7).
The MCF criterion expressed in equation (7) can be further simplified by
substituting for M CF = ρ(1 + r)/r(1 + ρ). Making this substitution and rearranging terms we see that the project is worthwhile provided that
(8) − dI 0 + B/ρ > 0
This is the SOC criterion proposed by Harberger (1973) and Sandmo-Dreze
(1971). Simply put, the representative agent is better oﬀ with the project as
long as its benefits discounted at the SOC rate exceeds its costs. There are no
“indirect revenue eﬀects” to take into account when the project’s benefits are
equivalent to income.
To summarize, there is no conflict between the SOC criterion and the MCF
criterion. The criteria diﬀer in terms of the benchmark that is used to measure
indirect revenue eﬀects. While the choice of benchmark is a matter of taste,
the reality is that indirect revenue eﬀects are diﬃcult to measure (and therefore
typically ignored in project evaluation). This being the case, it is best to choose
a criterion where ignoring indirect revenue eﬀects is least objectionable. On
these grounds, there are at least four situations where the SOC criterion would
seem to be the preferred choice.
1 1 Since

i
i
i
IRsoc
= IRi − τ ρB/(1 + r) if IRi = 0 then IRsoc
= −τ ρB/(1 + r) and if IRsoc
=0
then
= τ ρB/(1 + r). Thus the indirect revenue eﬀect that enters into the MCF criterion
is precisely equal, but opposite in sign, to the indirect revenue eﬀect that enters into the SOC
criterion.

IRi
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First, if a project yields benefits that are appropriable via user fees or normal market transactions, (i.e. benefits that the private sector can provide) the
appropriate discount rate is the SOC rate. Projects like electricity generation
or water and wastewater treatment services would fall into this category.
Second, for projects that yield benefits that the private sector appropriates
as a component of full income the appropriate discount rate is the SOC rate.
Education and training programs that improve labour skills thereby raising real
wages, or infrastructure projects whose benefits are reflected in higher land
values and rents would fall into this category.
Third, the SOC rate is appropriate for projects that provide services that
are a perfect substitute for some privately produced good such as “free” school
lunch programs, or public health care that reduces the demand for private health
care.
Fourth, if individuals purchase some market goods to mitigate the adverse effects of environmental bads, the benefits of an increment in government spending
to improve environmental quality can be measured by the reduction in private
spending on mitigation. Examples include the purchasing water filters or air
purifiers to defend against poor air or water quality.
In each of these situations an increase in the publicly provided good is equivalent to an equal value increase in lump sum transfers insofar as its impact on
private consumption is concerned. Therefore for a project that is just worth
doing, any impact of the project on capital income tax revenue will be oﬀset by
the impact of the lump sum tax increase needed to finance the project.

2.3

Shadow Pricing Algorithm

Now let us look at the social rate of time preference approach (STP) proposed
by Marglin (1964), Feldstein (1972), Bradford (1975) and Lind (1982). The
procedure is to convert all benefits and costs into “consumption equivalents” by
shadow pricing all investment displaced or induced and discount at the social
rate of time preference (which I will interpret as the after tax rate of return).
For a project requiring an initial expenditure of dI 0 and producing a stream of
output dg in each subsequent period worth B(dg) with these benefits being “fully
consumed”, the STP criterion judges the project to be worthwhile provided that
(9) − dI 0 ((1 − γ) + γSP C)) + B(dg)/r > 0.
Here γ is interpreted as the proportion of project financing that displaces
private investment (so (1 − γ) is the proportion that displaces consumption),
and SP C is the “shadow price of capital”, which is defined the present value
of the stream of consumption that is lost when a dollar of private investment is
displaced. Since private investment yields a pre-tax rate of return of ρ and the
representative agent consumes the annuity value of wealth, a dollar’s worth of
private investment is worth ρ/r in terms of foregone consumption.
Clearly, the shadow price of capital criterion is equivalent to the MCF criterion given in equation (5) only if the M CF happens to equal (1 − γ) + γSP C.
Most practitioners have assumed that γ represents the marginal propensity to
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save.12 Thus, if the government must raise lump sum taxes to finance the project
γ is the proportion of the lump sum tax increase that comes from reduced saving and 1 − γ is the proportion that comes from reduced consumption.13 If the
representative agent consumes the annuity value of wealth, the proportion of a
lump sum tax increase that comes from reduced consumption will be r/(1 + r).
It is then inferred that the proportion of the project’s expenditure that comes
from consumption is (1 − γ) = r/(1 + r) and the proportion that comes from
investment is γ = 1/(1 + r).
But this is incorrect. If the cost of the project is dI 0 the government must
raise lump sum taxes by dT 0 = M CF.dI 0 to finance the project, so the amount
of resources drawn from consumption is γdT 0 = rdT 0 /(1+r) = M CF.dI o .r/(1+
r) = ρdI 0 /(1 + ρ), and therefore the amount drawn from investment is dI 0 /(1 +
ρ).14 Using these proportions it is easy to confirm that (1−γ)+γSP C = M CF.
Thus, the present value of the consumption foregone per dollar of resources
diverted to the project is equal to the marginal cost of funds, i.e. the ratio of
the increase in lump sum taxes to the increase in the present value of total tax
collected.
Liu (2003) claims that the STP criterion is flawed, but he provides no intuition as to why. I have shown that the problem arises because of a failure
to distinguish between the expenditure requirements of the project and cost of
financing the expenditure requirements. Given the pre-existing capital income
tax distortion, the present value of the increase in lump sum taxes necessary
to finance the project will exceed the project’s expenditure requirements. In
order to determine the proportion of resources drawn from consumption one
must multiply the marginal propensity to consume by the M CF . If γ is interpreted as the proportion of the project’s expenditure requirement that displaces
investment (rather than the proportion of the cost of financing the project that
displaces investment) then the shadow pricing algorithm turns out to be perfectly consistent with the M CF criterion: both correctly identify projects that
make the infinitely lived representative agent better oﬀ.15
If the project’s benefits were treated as income instead of being “fully con1 2 See

e.g. Bradford (1975), Mendelshon (1981) and Lind (1982).
that the government must increase lump sum taxes to finance the project since the
project’s benefits are not treated as income, so any debt issued to finance the project would
be a future tax liability of equal present value.
1 4 The government could raise lump sum taxes by dT 0 = dI 0 in period 0 to maintain a balanced budget, but it would subsequently have to raise lump sum taxes further to compensate
for the loss in capital income tax revenue. The present value of the lump sum tax increase
necessary to finance the project is therefore dT 0 = MCF.dI 0 . The rational agent with perfect foresight will anticipate the tax increase required to finance the project and adjust her
consumption and saving accordingly.
1 5 The ‘equivalence’ result is robust to more complicated projects. Thus for a project that
requires expenditures of dI 0 and dI 1 and produces benefits worth B beginning in period 2,
the procedure is to first calculate the present value of the project’s expenditure requirements
(discounted at the pre-tax rate), namely dI 0 + dI 1 /(1 + ρ) then convert this into its ‘consumption equivalent’ by multiplying by 1 − γ + γSP C where SP C = ρ/r and γ = 1/(1 + ρ). If
the project’s benefits are ‘fully consumed’ the project is worthwhile according to the shadow
pricing algorithm if B/r(1 + r) − (dI 0 + dI 1 /(1 + ρ))(1 − γ + γSP C) > 0. This is equivalent
to the MCF criterion.
1 3 Note
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sumed”, the STP criterion in equation (9) would simplfy to
−dI 0 SP C + B(dg)/r > 0
Since the benefits are treated as income, financing the project would displace private investment dollar for dollar whenever the pre-tax rate of return
ρ is exogenous. Since SP C = ρ/r the STP criterion is equivalent to the SOC
criterion, a point made by Sjaastad and Wisecarver (1977). On the other hand,
the MCF criterion in this situation is given in equation (7), which amounts to
the same thing.
To summarize, using an infinitely lived representative agent model I have
reconciled 3 criteria for project evaluation that are prominent in the literature.
It turns out that if the criteria are appropriately applied they are consistent
with each other; they all correctly identify projects that make the infinitely
lived representative agent better oﬀ.

3

Overlapping Generations Model

The ILA model cannot address issues of inter-generational equity, which frequently arise in discussions about the appropriate social discount rate. Specifically, individuals alive when the project’s costs are incurred are not necessarily
alive to enjoy the benefits. To explicitly recognize the inter-generational implications of public investment decisions I will assume a simple overlapping
generations (OLG) model in which individuals live for two periods, working,
consuming and saving in their youth, and living oﬀ their assets in old age.
There are no bequests. In order to judge whether a project is worthwhile we
need a welfare criterion. Because I want to separate project assessment from
issues of inter-generational redistribution, I assume that a project is worthwhile
only if a Pareto improvement is possible. In other words, all generations must
be at least as well oﬀ with the project as without it, and at least one generation
must be better oﬀ. For the marginal project, all generations must be just as
well oﬀ. I show in the context of the OLG model that the SOC criterion and
the MCF criterion both satisfy this requirement, but the social rate of time
preference criterion (STP) does not.
Suppose an individual born in period t has the utility function
U (ct1 , g t ) + βU (ct2 )
where β represents the individual’s pure rate of time preference. In this
formulation the publicly provided good is assumed to be beneficial only to the
young.
As in the ILA model, the pre-tax wage w and rate of return ρ are exogenous
and there is a tax on capital income at rate τ , so ρ(1 − τ ) = r. The individual’s
budget constraint states that the present value of consumption equals wage
income minus lump sum taxes, where the discount rate equals the after tax rate
of return.Thus
ct1 + ct2 /(1 + r) = w − T t
The first order conditions determine the ordinary demand functions

11

ct1 (g t , T t ), ct2 (g t , T t ) = (1+r)st (g t , T t ) = (1+r)(w−T t −ct1 ), so an individual
born in period t chooses her intertemporal consumption plan conditional on the
available supply of the publicly provided good g t and the lump sum tax T t .
Now consider a project that requires an initial expenditure of dI 0 and yields
outputs in the subsequent two periods of dg 1 and dg 2 worth B 1 = B(dg 1 ) and
B 2 = B(dg 2 ). The benefits reflect what the subsequent two young generations are willing to pay for the project’s output in terms of contemporaneous
consumption.
If the project is to leave those currently alive no worse oﬀ it must be debt
financed. But a debt financed project will displace private investment dollar
for dollar because the pre-tax rate of return is exogenous. If the project is to
leave those living in the next two periods no worse oﬀ, the benefits they enjoy
must be at least as great as the lump sum tax increase they incur. Subsequent
generations receive no benefits, so they will be indiﬀerent to the project as long
as their lump sum tax is unaﬀected. Meanwhile, the project is feasible if the
present value of the increase in project expenditures is equal to the present value
of the increase in taxes, where the discount rate is the pre-tax rate of return.
Let V (g t , T t ) be the well-being of the young generation living in period t =
1, 2. The project will leave them just as well oﬀ if (∂V /∂g t )dg t +(∂V /∂T t )dT t =
0. Since ∂V /∂g t = (∂U/∂g t ) and ∂V /∂T t = −∂U/∂ct1 , generation t will be at
least as well oﬀ with the project if
(∂U/∂g t )/(∂U/∂ct1 )dg t − dT t ≥ 0
The coeﬃcient on dg t is the marginal rate of substitution between g t and
t
c1 , i.e. the individual’s marginal willingness to pay for a small increment in the
publicly provided good. Therefore, the project will be worthwhile provided that
(∗)B t − dT t ≥ 0, t = 1, 2.
Taxes in period t reflect lump sum taxes paid by the young plus capital
income taxes on the assets (saving) of the old so Rt = T t + τ ρst−1 . Note that
since the project is debt financed it will have no impact on saving in period 0,
and since benefits accrue only to the young in periods 1 and 2 there must be no
change in lump sum taxes in periods 3 and beyond. Therefore the project will
satisfy the government’s budget constraint provided that
(∗∗) − dI 0 + dT 1 /(1 + ρ) + (dT 2 + τ ρds1 )/(1 + ρ)2 + (τ ρds2 )/(1 + ρ)3 = 0.
But st (g t , T t ), so dst = (∂st /∂g t )dg t + (∂st /∂T t )dT t , t = 1, 2. Therefore,
substituting (∗) into (∗∗) the project will ©be worthwhile provided that ª
0
1
(10)−dI
/(1+ρ)+B 2 /(1+ρ)2 +τ ρª (∂s1 /∂g 1 )dg 1 + (∂s1 /∂T 1 )dT 1 /(1+
© +B
2
2
ρ) + τ ρ (∂s /∂g 2 )dg 2 + (∂s2 /∂T 2 )dT 2 /(1 + ρ)3 ≥ 0
Note that − ∂st /∂T t represents generation t0 s marginal propensity to save.
For simplicity assume the marginal propensity to save is the same for all generations so −∂st /∂T t = γ. Since a worthwhile project must satisfy B t − dT t ≥
0, t = 1, 2 , and focusing on the marginal project that is just worthwhile we can
substitute (∂st /∂T t )dT t = −γB t , t = 1, 2.
The indirect revenue eﬀect of the project according to the MCF criterion
is the impact of the project on capital income tax revenue. Specifically IRt =
τ ρ(∂st /∂g t )dg t /(1 + ρ). If the output of the project in period t aﬀects saving in
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period t it will aﬀect the capital income tax revenue collected in period t+1.The
indirect revenue eﬀect of the project in period t is the impact on capital income
tax revenue collected evaluated in period t, which explains why the term is
divided by 1 + ρ.
Making all the above substitutions in equation
(10) we arrive at the
£
¤ condition
(11)−dI 0 +IR1 /(1+ρ)+IR2 /(1+ρ)2 + B 1 /(1 + ρ) + B 2 /(1 + ρ)2 [1 − τ ργ/(1 + ρ)] ≥
0
The last term in square brackets represents the increase in the present value
of tax revenue collected per dollar increase in lump sum tax. The reciprocal
represents the marginal cost of funds for a lump sum tax. Thus, a project
is just worthwhile (i.e. enables all generations to be just as well oﬀ) if the
present value of its expenditure requirements minus its indirect revenue eﬀects
discounted at the pre-tax rate of return and multiplied by the MCF equals the
present value of its benefits discounted at the pre-tax rate of return. This is the
MCF criterion proposed by Liu et al (2004).
These authors argue that the SOC criterion, which proposes to discount
benefits and costs at the SOC rate, is flawed for two reasons. First, it ignores
the fact that the MCF is greater than one for a lump sum tax. Second, it
looks only at the project’s direct costs and benefits and ignores the existence of
indirect revenue eﬀects. Reasoning from a version of the MCF criterion similar
to equation (11), they maintain that the appropriate social discount rate will
not be equal to the social opportunity cost of public funds (here represented
by ρ) except under very special circumstances. For a project with no indirect
revenue eﬀects they claim that the appropriate social discount rate will exceed
ρ because MCF exceeds unity. In general, the appropriate social discount rate
will be “project specific”.
All of these claims are false. They reflect a misunderstanding about how to
implement the SOC criterion. The appropriate social discount rate is indeed the
social opportunity cost of public funds, here represented by ρ, and it is project
independent. The SOC criterion recognizes the possibility of indirect revenue
eﬀects, but compared to the MCF criterion indirect revenue eﬀects reflect the
compensated impact of the project on capital income taxes rather than the
uncompensated impact. Finally, the marginal cost of funds exceeds unity for
a lump sum tax but it is irrelevant in implementing the SOC criterion.
Recall that the uncompensated impact of the project with output dg t on
capital income tax revenue valued in period t is IRt = τ ρ(∂st /∂g t )dg t /(1 + ρ).
t
Therefore the compensated impact of the project is IRsoc
= τ ρ [∂st /∂g t − pg ∂st /∂y t ] dg t /(1+
t
t
t
t
ρ). Since ∂s /∂y = γ, and pg dg = B(dg ), we can write
t
IRsoc
= IRt − τ ργB t /(1 + ρ).
Now use this expression to replace IRt in£ equation (11) to obtain ¤
1
2
(12)−dI 0 +IRsoc
/(1+ρ)+IRsoc
/(1+ρ)2 + B 1 /(1 + ρ) + B 2 /(1 + ρ)2 [1 − τ ργ/(1 + ρ)] ≥
0
This simplifies to
1
2
(13) − dI 0 + IRsoc
/(1 + ρ) + IRsoc
/(1 + ρ)2 + B 1 /(1 + ρ) + B 2 /(1 + ρ)2 ≥ 0
which is the SOC criterion. Benefits and costs, including indirect revenue
eﬀects, are discounted at a rate that reflects the social opportunity cost of
13

capital.

3.1

Two Special Cases

Now let us return to the two special cases previously discussed: project benefits
treated as income; and project benefits fully consumed.
Suppose the individual’s utility function takes the form
U (ct1 , q(g t , et1 )) + βU (ct2 )
Here g t is not consumed directly, but rather serves as an input along with a
component of private spending et1 in the “household production” of q t .
Then an increase in project output of dg t accompanied by an increase in
lump sum taxes dT t equal to the individual’s willingness to pay for dg t will
leave ct1 and ct2 unchanged and reduce et1 by det1 = −dT t . The project’s benefits
are regarded as a perfect substitute for income. The compensated eﬀect of
the project on saving and therefore capital income tax revenue will be zero, so
the indirect revenue eﬀects relevant for the SOC criterion will be zero. Thus,
setting the terms in braces in equation (10) equal to zero, or equivalently setting
t
IRsoc
= 0 for t = 1, 2 in equation (13) we have the condition
(14) − dI 0 + B 1 /(1 + ρ) + B 2 /(1 + ρ)2 ≥ 0
which is the SOC criterion.
t
But recall that IRsoc
= IRt − τ ργB t /(1 + ρ). Therefore IRt = τ ργB t /(1 +
ρ) > 0. Substitute for IRt in equation (11) and we have a version of the MCF
criterion that reduces to (14).
Next, suppose that the individual’s utility function, in addition to being
additively separable intertemporally, has the property that ∂ 2 U/∂ct1 /∂g t = 0.
Then an increase in g t has no impact on the ordinary (uncompensated) demands
for private goods, and therefore no impact on saving or capital income tax
revenue. The indirect revenue eﬀects that are relevant for the MCF criterion
are therefore equal to zero. Setting IRt = 0 for t = 1, 2 in equation (11) we
have the simplified
£ MCF criterion
¤
(15) − dI 0 + B 1 /(1 + ρ) + B 2 /(1 + ρ)2 [1 − τ ργ/(1 + ρ)] ≥ 0
Thus the project’s benefits and costs should be discounted at the pre-tax
rate of return, but the costs should be multiplied by the MCF.
t
t
But since IRsoc
= IRt − τ ργB t /(1 + ρ), whenever IRt = 0 then IRsoc
=
t
−τ ργB t /(1 + ρ) < 0. Substitute for IRsoc
in equation (13) and we have a
version of the SOC criterion that reduces to (15).
Thus once again we see that there is no conflict between the SOC criterion
when it is implemented correctly and the MCF criterion proposed by Liu et al
(2004). As noted by Ballard and Fullerton (1992) there is ambiguity in the
literature regarding the meaning of the marginal cost of funds. According to
the Pigou-Harberger-Browning tradition the benchmark is a project characterized by compensated independence and the MCF is equal to unity for a lump
sum tax because the tax does not shift the compensated demand (supply) for
the tax distorted good (factor). According to the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-AtkinsonStern tradition, the benchmark is a project characterized by uncompensated
independence and the MCF can be greater or less than one for a lump sum tax
14

depending on the tax regime. The tax shifts the uncompensated demand (supply) for the tax distorted good (factor) but the spending of tax revenue has an
oﬀsetting income eﬀect. Liu et al (2004) follow the latter approach in arriving
at their MCF criterion. I have followed the former approach and arrived at the
SOC criterion, which amounts to the same thing.

3.2

Shadow Pricing Algorithm

Finally, let us consider the shadow pricing algorithm proposed by Marglin, Feldstein, Bradford and Lind. All benefits and costs must be converted into “consumption equivalents” by shadow pricing any investment displaced or induced
by the project and then discounted at the social rate of time preference (after tax rate of return). If the benefits are fully consumed the criterion for a
worthwhile project is
−dI 0 ((1 − γ) + γSP C) + B 1 /(1 + r) + B 2 /(1 + r)2 > 0
where γ is the proportion of funding that displaces private investment and
SP C is the shadow price of capital. In the OLG model a dollar’s worth of
investment produces 1 + ρ dollar’s worth of consumption in the next period
so SP C = (1 + ρ)/(1 + r). Also, since the project yields benefits only to
young generations living in the subsequent two periods the project must be
debt financed to avoid an inter-generational transfer from current to future
generations. Furthermore, since the pre-tax rate of return is exogenous the
funding will displace private investment dollar for dollar so γ = 1. In the
present example the STP criterion becomes
−dI 0 (1 + ρ)/(1 + r) + B 1 /(1 + r) + B 2 /(1 + r)2 > 0
This diﬀers from the MCF criterion for a project whose benefits are fully consumed given in equation (15). The shadow pricing algorithm discounts benefits
at r rather than ρ, which therefore overstates the benefits, but it also multiplies
costs by a shadow price of capital that exceeds the marginal cost of funds thereby
overstating costs. Thus it is not possible to rank the STP criterion versus the
MCF criterion in this example. All that can be said is that the internal rates
of return on the marginal project diﬀer according to the two criteria. However,
since we have already shown that the MCF criterion is necessary and suﬃcient
for a Pareto improvement to be possible we can conclude that the STP criterion
fails to meet this standard.
What if the benefits are treated as income rather than being “fully consumed”? Specifically, what if each generation that receives benefits alters its
intertemporal consumption plan by consuming only part of the benefits while
young and saving the remainder for old age? The STP criterion then becomes
−dI0 (1+ρ)/(1+r)+B 1 [(1 − γ) + γSP C] /(1+r)+B 2 [(1 − γ) + γSP C] /(1+
2
r) > 0
Once again, the project must be debt financed to avoid burdening those
currently alive, so the funding will displace private investment dollar for dollar.
But those living in the subsequent two periods will treat the project’s benefits as
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income and save a proportion γ, with each dollar saved having a “consumption
equivalent” value of (1 + ρ)/(1 + r).
It is easy to confirm that the STP criterion will judge a project as worthwhile
even though it fails to satisfy the SOC criterion, and therefore the STP criterion
fails to ensure that a Pareto improvement is possible.
To emphasize this point, consider an investment costing dI 0 and yielding
benefits worth B in all subsequent periods. Assume that these benefits are
treated as income. If the project is debt financed the STP criterion would judge
the project as worthwhile if
−dI 0 (1 + ρ)/(1 + r) + B [1 − γ + γ(1 + ρ)/(1 + r)] /r > 0
whereas the SOC criterion would judge the project as worthwhile if
−dI 0 + B/ρ > 0.
Suppose ρ = .1, r = .03, and γ = .25.Then the STP criterion would judge
the project as worthwhile provided that its internal rate of return was greater
than 3.15% even though the resources to finance the project are drawn from
private investment that would have earned 10%.

3.3

The SOC Criterion without the Compensation Test

Those who advocate the STP criterion are explicitly or implicitly dismissing
the relevance of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test. They are assuming that
a social welfare gain can occur even if a Pareto improvement is not possible.
Specifically, a project can be worthwhile even if those currently alive are made
worse oﬀ, provided that for every dollar of consumption foregone by the current
generation the next generation’s consumption increases by at least 1 + r dollars,
or the subsequent generation’s consumption increases by (1 + r)2 , etc. However,
satisfying the STP criterion is still not suﬃcient to recommend the project
because other more worthy investment opportunities may be available.
To emphasize this point, consider a simple one period project that costs dI 0
and produces benefits worth B 1 to the next young generation who will treat the
benefits as income. Suppose the project is tax financed, and let γ represent the
proportion of tax revenue drawn from saving. The STP criterion would judge
the project as worthwhile provided that
B 1 [1 − γ + γ(1 + ρ)/(1 + r)] /(1 + r) > dI 0 [1 − γ + γ(1 + ρ)/(1 + r)].
The expression on the left hand side represents the present value of the
stream of consumption induced by the project, and the expression on the right
hand side represents the present value of the stream of consumption displaced
when the project is financed. The STP criterion judges the project as worthwhile
because it induces a more valuable consumption stream than it displaces. The
project yields a “social welfare improvement” according to the social welfare
function that has been (implicitly) adopted. Since the expression in squared
brackets is common to both sides, the STP criterion judges the project to be
worthwhile provided that B 1 /(1 + r) > dI 0 . The project must have an internal
rate of return in excess of the social rate of time preference (after tax rate of
return) to be worthwhile.
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By contrast, the SOC criterion would require that the project’s internal rate
of return exceed the social opportunity cost of capital in order to be worthwhile.
B 1 /(1 + ρ) > dI 0
Note that this is true whether the project is financed by increasing lump
sum taxes or by borrowing.
Before we undertake the project on the strength of the STP criterion, we
should check to see whether there are alternative uses of the funds that could
make everyone even better oﬀ.
Proponents of the STP criterion recognize that there may be higher return investments available in the private sector, but they rule these out on the grounds
that private sector investments are not feasible alternatives for the government
to pursue on political grounds. “Government investment is restricted to certain
classes of activity”, according to Bradford (1975, p. 888), and “significant areas of economic activity are reserved for private enterprise”, according to Lind
(1982, pp. 30-31). These authors seem to think that with the tax structure
taken as given, the only way the government can encourage private investment
using the tax dollars available is to invest directly in the private sector, or to
subsidize particular private sector activities. But there is a third option: use
the tax dollars to pay down the debt.
The government’s budget constraint in period t can be written as:
D1 = (1 + r)D0 + G − τ ρK 0 − T 0 .
Here D0 represents government debt at the beginning of period 0, G represents statutory social security benefits paid to the retired generation (which
I shall assume remains fixed throughout). Clearly, if the government increases
lump sum taxes in period 0 and uses the funds for debt reduction it will reduce the government debt outstanding at the beginning of period 1 by an
equal amount (because all other variables in the equation are pre-determined).
Thus, ∆D1 = −∆T 0 . Now consider the assets-saving relationship written as:
1
A1 = s0 = γ(w − T 0 ). Here A represents the economy’s assets at the beginning
of period 1. Assets in any period consist of private capital and government debt
so A1 = K 1 + D1 . According to the assets-saving relationship, an increase in
the lump sum tax in period 0 that is used to reduce the government’s borrowing
in period 1 will increase private investment in period 1 by ∆K 1 = (1 − γ)∆T 0 .
The change in private investment is the sum of two components: the reduction −γ∆T 0 that occurs because the tax reduces the pool of saving, and the
increase ∆T 0 that occurs because the tax increase is used to reduce government
debt. Thus, if the additional tax dollars raised in period 0 are used to pay down
the debt rather than to finance the project, private investment will increase in
period 1 by exactly the amount that government borrowing is reduced.
To compare the project to the alternative of using the tax dollars for debt
reduction I assume that the government returns all the benefits of debt reduction
to the next working generation by a tax cut. Specifically, it reduces the lump
sum tax in period 1 by the amount necessary for government borrowing in
period 2 to equal its level in period 0. Since the government budget constraint
1
in period 1 is: D2 = (1 + r)D1 + G − τ ρK 1 − T and since ∆D2 = 0 by
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assumption, then ∆T 1 = (1 + r)∆D1 − τ ρ∆K . But when the additional tax
dollars collected in period 0 are used for debt reduction ∆K 1 = −∆D1 so
∆T 1 = (1 + ρ)∆D1 = −(1 + ρ)dI 0 . Thus the “debt reduction” project in period
0 that costs dI 0 dollars of tax revenue will allow the working generation in period
1 to enjoy a tax cut of (1 + ρ)dI 0 . Assuming that debt reduction is a feasible
use of tax dollars, the benefits of any proposed project should be compared to
the benefits of debt reduction. A project will benefit the next generation by
more than debt reduction would only if B 1 > dI 0 (1 + ρ). This is equivalent
to the SOC criterion. In other words, even if the project is tax financed,
it should be evaluated as if the marginal source of funding were the
capital market unless it can be shown that debt reduction is not a
viable use of tax dollars.

4

Concluding Remarks

Liu (2003) and Liu et al (2004) claim that the SOC criterion suﬀers from “severe implementation problems”. Specifically, there is no general formula for the
proportions of funding that are drawn from consumption and investment; the
proportions depend upon the project, making the discount rate “project specific”. These authors are interpreting the SOC as the internal rate of return on
a project that is just worthwhile. By this methodology, when comparing two
projects with identical costs and benefits, a project with positive indirect revenue eﬀects, (i.e. a project that generates additional capital income tax revenue)
will have a lower SOC than a project with no indirect revenue eﬀects. However,
if we follow Harberger (1973) and define the SOC as the “social opportunity
cost of public funds”, i.e. the rate of return foregone when the government borrows to finance a project whose benefits are equivalent to a lump sum transfer,
the SOC rate will be unique and common to all projects. If there are indirect
revenue eﬀects they will be added to or subtracted from the benefits, and not
incorporated by adjusting the SOC. Unlike the SOC criterion, Liu’s MCF criterion requires no weights; all that is needed are estimates of the pre-tax and
post-tax rates of return and the MCF, all of which are project independent.
However, while the MCF is project independent, it is model dependent. In
particular, the MCF will depend upon the pre and post-tax rates of return
and the marginal propensity to save (among other things), and the marginal
propensity to save will depend upon the time horizon and bequest motive of the
representative agent. On the other hand, the weights needed to apply the SOC
criterion will in general depend upon the elasticities of supply and demand for
capital. It is therefore misleading to claim that the MCF criterion is exempt
from implementation problems any more than is the SOC criterion.
The real diﬀerence between the two criteria is the type of project being
evaluated. Are project benefits perceived as income or are they fully consumed,
or are they neither? If benefits are treated as income then the SOC criterion
has an implementation advantage because no indirect revenue eﬀects need to be
taken into account. If benefits are fully consumed then Liu’s MCF criterion has

18

an implementation advantage for the same reason. If benefits are neither fully
consumed nor treated as income there will be indirect revenue eﬀects to take
into account using either criterion, and since there is a well defined relationship
between the indirect revenue eﬀects that apply to each criterion they will be
equally diﬃcult to measure in practical applications.
To summarize, there are 3 points to take away from this discussion.
First, the STP criterion proposed by Marglin, Feldstein, Bradford and Lind
can be ‘rescued’ in the ILA model, but it is fundamentally flawed in the OLG
model because it violates the compensation test and thereby fails to ensure
that a Pareto improvement is possible. The STP criterion discounts benefits at
the social rate of time preference (here equated to the after tax rate of return).
However, whenever the benefits in diﬀerent time periods accrue to diﬀerent generations it is inappropriate to discount them at the after tax rate of return in
judging whether a project can achieve a Pareto improvement. Even if the compensation test is deemed to be irrelevant, the STP criterion is still inappropriate
because it leads to situations where a project may be judged worthwhile when
there are alternatives that would make everyone even better oﬀ.
Second, Liu’s criterion incorporating the MCF is sensitive to the underlying
model. Not only is the MCF for a particular tax (e.g. a lump sum tax) model
sensitive, but so is the appropriate social discount rate. Specifically, benefits are
discounted at the pre-tax rate of return in the OLG model but at the after-tax
rate of return in the ILA model. Thus in an economy with a given distortive tax
on capital income a project with a given time stream of costs and benefits will
be evaluated diﬀerently depending upon whether individuals have finite lives
(and make no bequests) or act as if they live forever (i.e. identify with their
heirs). This is a peculiar feature of the MCF criterion that I would argue makes
it particularly diﬃcult to implement in practice.
Third, the SOC criterion implies a social discount rate that is invariant to
the model. The appropriate discount rate for evaluating costs and benefits
(including any indirect revenue eﬀects) is always and everywhere the rate of
return foregone in the private sector. While indirect revenue eﬀects are zero
only if the project’s benefits are equivalent to income, this seems like a more
reasonable benchmark for most projects than assuming that benefits have no
impact whatsoever on private sector behaviour.16
Throughout I have assumed that the pre-tax rate of return is exogenous. The
“weighted average” discount rate is therefore simply the pre-tax rate of return.
The cut oﬀ rate of return for any worthwhile project is therefore unique and
common to all projects. In particular, it is independent of the time duration of
costs and benefits. In models where the pre-tax rate of return is endogenous, the
SOC will be a weighted average of the pre-tax and after-tax rates of return, the
latter representing the social rate of time preference. This raises the question
as to whether the weights depend upon the duration of the project. An early
1 6 If there are indirect revenue eﬀects (because the project’s benefits are not equivalent
to income) they would diﬀer depending upon whether the ILA model or the OLG model is
judged to be the most appropriate specification. In this respect the SOC criterion is also
model sensitive.

19

paper by Diamond (1968) and a subsequent paper by Dreze (1974) made this
point, but in the context of a model with a finite number of periods. However,
if the tax regime is given and time invariant and the economy is in a steady
state the cut oﬀ rate of return for all worthwhile projects will be independent
of the duration of the project. Thus what is needed for project evaluation are
estimates of benefits measured by willingness to pay, estimates of direct project
expenditures, and estimates of indirect revenue eﬀects whenever the project’s
compensated impact on distorted markets diﬀers from zero. The appropriate
discount rate is the social opportunity cost of capital, and it is independent of
the project.
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